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Abstract
Lattice gas cellular automata (Lgca) are particular cellular automata that imitate the behavior of par-
ticles moving on a lattice. We used a particular set of Lgca rules, called hpp, to mix bits in data blocks
and obtain a symmetric cryptographic algorithm. The encryption and decryption keys are the positions
of perturbation sites on the lattice (walls). Basically, this paper presents an original way to perform cryp-
tographic operations, based on cellular automata. In this paper, we show several characteristics about
our algorithm: typical block size (22n−1), key-length (2n), number of rounds (2n+1). We also evaluate
avalanche and strict avalanche properties with respect to key and plain text. Finally, we highlight the
underbellies of our method and give clues to solve them.
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Introduction
We propose to use a particular kind of cellular automata, called lattice gas cellular automata (Lgca),
as a symmetric cryptographic algorithm: Encryption and decryption are achieved by the same algorithm
and same key. One of the advantages of this algorithm is the number of parameters that can be modified,
such as the size of data blocks, the size of keys, number of rounds... In the first section, we recall what is
symmetric block cryptography and how the issue of cellular automata cryptography has been addressed
yet. In section 2, we introduce lattice gas cellular automata which may be new to the cryptography
community. In the third section, we detail how a particular set of rules, called hpp [1] can be used to
encrypt any data. In section 4, we show how the different algorithm parameters (number of rounds, key
size...) influence the ciphered block using gray levels images. In the last section, we check the avalanche
and strict avalanche properties and point out the weaknesses of our method. Then, we conclude.
1. Cellular automata and Cryptography
Cryptography techniques may be divided into two categories: symmetric-key and public-key algo-
rithms. Using symmetric key cryptography means that either the same key is used for encryption and
decryption or it is easy to obtain one key from another.
On the contrary, if the sender and the receiver do not use the same key, and it is hard to compute
the receiver’s key from the sender’s one, we use asymmetric cryptography.
This paper deals with the first category algorithms. More precisely, symmetric cryptography falls
into stream or block ciphers. A stream cipher encrypts one byte at a time whereas a block cipher breaks
up the message into fixed length blocks and encrypts one block at a time. This work is about a cellular
automaton based symmetric block cipher.
Connecting cryptography and cellular automata (ca) is not new. But every cryptography topic do not
have the same relationship with cellular automata. First of all, during the 80’s, Wolfram [2] showed that
ca were good pseudo random number generators. As random number generators have a very important
role in stream cipher algorithms, ca based stream cipher algorithms have been widely studied [3, 4, 5, 6, 7].
The common principle of these works is to use the initial ca state as a seed and to run the ca in order to
generate a random sequence. This sequence is then used in the stream cipher algorithm (Vernam cipher
for instance).
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On the opposite, ca based public key cryptography literature is not abundant. See for instance [8, 9,
10].
Between the two opposites, several papers tackle the issue of symmetric block encryption. Most of
them use a key built on the ca rules [9, 11].
From this point of view, our approach is quite different. Indeed, in our algorithm, keys are encoded
in the ca state rather than in the ca rules. This is due to the particular kind of ca we used: Lattice
Gas Cellular Automata.
Nevertheless, we recently found a very similar approach in [12] (the present work was initiated a
(very) long time ago...). In paper [12], the authors also propose a block cipher symmetric cryptography
based on Lgca. Contrary to us, they do not focus on a particular lgca but tackle the issue in a more
general way. The secret key in [12] is xored each step with the lattice state (see section 2.1) whereas we
added a particular step called reflection in our algorithm to process the key (to a certain extend, the two
approaches are similar, although our is more visual, but less general). Besides, some remarks are similar :
number of rounds, propagation of error. Finally, differential cryptography issue is tackled in [12] whereas
we focused on avalanche and strict avalanche properties.
2. Lattice Gas Cellular Automata
The world of ca [13, 14] gave birth to particular simulation methods called Lattice Gas Cellular
Automata (Lgca) [15]. Lgca are designed to mimic the moves of many particles on a grid. The first
Lgca has been proposed in 1973 by Hardy, Pazzis and Pomeau [1]. It is this particular Lgca called Hpp
that we use in this paper.
2.1. Hpp
Hpp is a two-dimensional cellular automaton living on a square lattice. The Von Neumann neighbor-
hood is used: each cell has four neighbors. Each cell may be occupied by up to four particles: the east,
the north, the west and the south particle.
Figure 1 shows a lattice made of 6 cells. The upper-left corner cell is occupied by the north and the
east particles. Its right neighbor is empty and its bottom neighbor is occupied by the four particles.
It is convenient to represent the state of a cell by a four bits number: the most significant bit will be
the east particle, followed by the south, west and north particles.
The upper line of Figure 1 can be represented as: 1001 0000 1010 (9 0A in hexa).
Evolution of particles in Hpp is a two steps algorithm. First, particles collide in a cell, then particles
propagate.
a b c
ed f
Figure 1: A sample lattice with 6 cells
Among the 16 possible cell configurations, particles do collide in only two particular configurations:
1010 and 0101. For instance, on Figure 1, particles in cell c and e will collide. No collision will occur in
other cells.
A west-east collision will give a north-south configuration, and a north-south collision will give a
west-east configuration.
After the collision step, the lattice of Figure 1 will turn into the lattice of Figure 2.
a b c
ed f
Figure 2: The sample lattice (fig. 1) after the collision step
The propagation step follows. During this step, every particle will move. The north particle of a
given cell will move up (and remain a north particle). The west particle will move left (and remain a
west particle) etc.
After the propagation step, the lattice of Figure 2 will turn into the lattice of Figure 3.
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a b c
ed f
Figure 3: The sample lattice (fig. 1) after the collision (fig. 2 and the propagation step
We have seen how particles move on a 2-dimensional infinite lattice. The Hpp rules may also be used
on a finite lattice by connecting the upper and lower bounds as well as the right and left bounds of the
lattice (torus topology).
Figure 4 shows the first evolution rounds of a 4× 4 toric lattice. As mentioned above, the set of cells
may be represented as set of 16× 4 bits i.e. 8 bytes. The top-left corner cell will be the most significant
4 bits of the first byte. The cell on its right will be the less significant 4 bits of the first byte and so on.
In the first step, the top left corner site contains west and north particles (1001→ 9). Its right neighbor
contains no particle (0). The third site of the top line contains east and west particle (1001 → A). Le
last site only contains the west particle (0010→ 2).
Here are the 8 bytes representing the initial state, and the 2 states obtained after the propagation
step (hexadecimal numbers):
• 90 A2 F5 15 5D 10 00 00
• 18 30 A9 F2 48 82 14 10
• 17 90 02 A8 50 F8 50 10
collision
propagation
collision
propagation
Figure 4: Particles evolving on a toric lattice
Now, we know how to make a set of bytes evolve. Let us add perturbation sites.
2.2. Obstacles Reflections
We now introduce special cells known as ’walls’ or ’obstacles’, and a step called ’reflection’. After
the collision and propagation steps, direction of particles that live on a wall cell are inverted, so that the
north and south, as well as east and west are swapped.
Figure 5 shows an example of a 3× 2 lattice with two ’walls’ on cells b and d.
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collision
reflection
propagation
Figure 5: Collision, propagation and reflection step on two walls
3. HPP Symmetric Cryptography
In this section, we show how Hpp rules could be used as a symmetric cryptographic algorithm. We
first recall that Hpp simulations are reversible. Then we detail the steps of the cryptographic algorithm.
Finally, we propose to use obstacles positions as a secret key.
3.1. Time Reversibility
The most important property of Hpp rules we used to design the cryptographic algorithm is time
reversibility. In other words, we used the fact that, during particles evolutions, no information is lost,
and the initial configuration can be computed from any subsequent configuration.
Even though we focused on Hpp rules, any Lgca set of rules could make the job. The condition is
that the set of rules is time reversible. This is not the case for Fhp rules [16], on an hexagonal lattice:
the collision step, for physical realism reasons (chirality), is probabilistic. As we are not interested in
physical realism, Fhp rules could be modified to be time reversible.
3.2. Cryptographic Algorithm
The way we used Hpp as a cryptographic algorithm may now be clear:
1. Choose a lattice size. It may be convenient to choose a power of two. For instance 256× 256.
2. Segment raw data into blocks to populate the lattice. For a 256 × 256 grid, we need 32768 bytes
data blocks, as every cell is populated with 4 bits.
3. Choose a secret key, and use this secret key to compute the walls positions. The way how a secret
key is chosen and how it is used will be tackled in section 3.3.
4. Choose n, the number of rounds that will be computed.
5. For each clear data block:
• Apply n times: collision, propagation, reflection.
• Reverse time (to get an involutive algorithm).
• Get the encrypted data block.
Decryption is achieved by applying exactly the same algorithm to encrypted data blocks, provided
each parameter is the same:
• block size
• secret key
• number of rounds
3.3. Secret Key
The secret key is the position of the walls on the grid. If the lattice size is a power of two, say 2n×2n,
the coordinates of a cell may be represented with 2 × n bits. As a consequence, for a 2n × 2n lattice,
and K walls, the size of the key must be 2nK bits. However, the number of real keys is not 22nK , as
exchanging certain walls positions might give the same key, and several walls may be in the same cell.
The number of walls configurations is the number of multisets of cardinality K of elements taken from a
set of cardinality 22n: ((
22n
K
))
= C2
2n+K−1
K =
(22n + K − 1)!
K!(22n − 1)!
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The number of potential secret keys is quite important. If we use a 256 × 256 lattice (n = 8), and
256 walls (K = 256), the number of different walls configurations is C256
2+256−1
256 ≈ 2× 10726. For a small
64 × 64 lattice (n = 6, 2048 bytes data blocks) and 32 walls (K=32), the number of available keys is
about 1.6× 1080.
4. Experimental Results : LGCA point of view
In this section, we show how to choose a key and the number of rounds. We also point out the problem
of invariants which may be a problem in cryptographic applications whereas it is a desirable behavior in
lgca.
In this section, we used pictures as the properties we want to show can be well understood by thinking
of our algorithm as a lattice-gas cellular automaton. Nevertheless, one must keep in mind that our block
cipher is not particularly designed to encrypt pictures, but any data block.
Each cell of the automaton may be represented by a 4 bits number. We use this number as a gray
level. Thus, a 2n×2n lattice populated with particles is turned into a 16 gray levels image of size 2n×2n.
In the following, we used two 64× 64 images (Figure 6).
(a) Eiffel tower (b) A squirrel
Figure 6: Images used in our tests
4.1. Number of Rounds
First, we encrypt our image, with only one wall (look at the (very) small cross) in the center (Figure 7).
Then, we remove the wall, and try to decrypt the picture. We first make this experiment with a 16 rounds
algorithm (Figure 8), and then with a 128 rounds algorithm (Figure 9).
We see that if the number of rounds is not large enough, a part of the image can be decrypted
without the key. This is an evidence that a wall can not influence cells that are too far. More precisely,
by computing N rounds, cells that are outside the discus of radius N (we consider the Hamming distance)
and centered on the wall will not be affected by the wall. Cells that are inside the discus may or may not
be affected: it depends on the particles positions, that is not known a priori.
The consequence is that we must choose a large enough value for N so that every cell is affected by
every walls, whatever the position of the walls.
Let us choose a number of rounds such that every cell can be affected by every wall. For a 2n × 2n
lattice, the maximal Hamming distance is 2n (keep in mind the lattice is on a torus). By choosing
N = 2n, we avoid the problem of key-unaffected bits. Unfortunately, computing 2n rounds may be time
consuming.
One may think that, because of the large number of walls, it is possible to reduce the number of
rounds. It would not be a good idea.
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Figure 7: Clear picture, with a central wall (small white cross)
(a) Encrypted picture (b) Decrypted picture, without the central wall
Figure 8: Encrypted picture, and the decrypted picture obtained by omitting the central wall (16 rounds)
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(a) Encrypted picture (b) Decrypted picture, without the central wall
Figure 9: Encrypted picture, and the decrypted picture obtained by omitting the central wall (128 rounds)
Here is another example: the squirrel of Figure 10(a) is encrypted with a 13 walls key. Unfortunately,
the keys are not well spread and there is no wall next to the squirrel’s head. Using a number of rounds
too low (say 24), we obtain the encrypted picture of Figure 10(b). It is then possible to decrypt a part
of the image (squirrel’s head) by applying the algorithm with a key that does not contain a wall next to
the head. We then obtain the picture of Figure 10(c).
This would be impossible with a higher number of rounds.
The only way to avoid (to a certain extend) the decryption of parts of an image by only knowing
parts of the key, is to choose a number of rounds such that each wall influences every cell.
By using a key of about 2n−1 walls (2n × 2n is the size of the image), and a number of rounds of 2n,
the algorithm would be very sensible to key variations. Figure 11(a) shows the 64×64 squirrel encrypted
with a 32 walls key and 64 rounds.
This encrypted image is decrypted by a key that differs only on one wall, that is shifted right one cell.
The ’decrypted’ picture is shown on Figure 11(b)
In section 5, we will see that, for a 64 × 64 lattice (2048 bytes), a good number of rounds is in fact
128.
4.2. Algorithms Invariants
Hpp, as well as most Lgca rules, have been designed to simulate physical systems. One characteristic
is that Lgca obey physical laws such as mass conservation, momentum conservation...
For our particular application, this is a great disadvantage. For Hpp model, mass and momentum
are the same, because each particle has the same velocity. More informations about real or spurious
invariants in Lgca can be found in [15].
For our application, it means that the number of bits equal to 1 remains constant in a data block.
This is very annoying, especially if the number of 1’s (or 0’s) is very low.
On our gray levels pictures, it means that a black picture will remain black, whatever the number of
walls, their positions, and the number of rounds...
We conclude that the algorithm must not be used on data blocks that contain redundant informations.
Let us consider the issue in this way: the number of bits equal to 1 in the clear block can be deduced
from the number of bits equal to 1 in the encrypted block. How to make this information useless? We
could for instance only consider data blocks where the number of 1’s is always about half the number of
bits. If the algorithm is only applied on such blocks, the knowledge of the number of 1’s becomes useless.
Consequently, we need a preprocessing step that turns any data blocks into data blocks containing
as many 1’s as 0’s. This job may be done with almost any compression algorithm, that theoretically
produce random-like data (Gnu/gzip utility (Lempel-Ziv algorithm) for instance).
Using compression mainly solves the mass invariance of Lgca. Furthermore it speeds up encryption.
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(a) Original image. No wall next to the head (b) Encrypted image with 24 rounds
(c) Decrypted image with a wrong key
Figure 10: A part of the image can be decrypted if the number of rounds is too low: the squirrel’s head is visible
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(a) Encrypted image with 32 walls and 64 rounds (b) Decrypted image with very slightly different key
Figure 11: With a large key and a large number of rounds, the algorithm is very sensible to key variations
5. Experimental Results : cryptography point of view
5.1. Avalanche property
Any encryption algorithm should satisfy the following property: a small change in the key or in the
plain text should result in a great modification of the ciphered text. More precisely, if we invert one bit
in the plain text or in the key, we expect that nearly half ciphered text bits are inverted. This property,
called avalanche property has been introduced in [17].
To show the avalanche property, we encrypt 2048 bytes blocks (64× 64 lattice). The key is 56 bytes
long.
We used the following algorithm to produce the Figure 12 that shows the percentage of bits that have
been inverted as a function of the number of rounds1:
t← 2048 random bytes
k ← 48 random bytes
for r = 10 : 10 : 200 do
p← 0
cref ← encrypt(t, k) with r rounds
for i = 0 to 383 do
k2 ← k with bit i inverted
c2 ← encrypt(t, k2) with r rounds
p← p+fraction of inverted bits between cref and c2
end for
p← p/384
plot the point (r, p)
end for
Figure 12 shows that avalanche property is satisfied with respect to the key.
In order to check the avalanche property with respect to the plain text bits, we used a similar algorithm,
executed 20 times:
t← 128 random bytes
k ← 8 random bytes
for r = 10 : 2 : 200 do
p← 0
cref ← encrypt(t, k) with r rounds
1This algorithm has been executed 5 times, Figure 12 represents the average results
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Figure 12: Avalanche property if we change one bit of the key
for i = 0 to 1023 do
t2 ← t with bit i inverted
c2 ← encrypt(t2, k) with r rounds
p← p+fraction of inverted bits between cref and c2
end for
p← p/1024
plot the point (r, p)
end for
Figure 13 shows the surprising results. Only 25 percent of output bits have been changed. This
annoying phenomenon is explained in the following subsection.
One can think that the distribution of walls is of great importance. We checked the behaviour of the
avalanche property for key walls restricted to a small area of the grid (a 8 × 8 subgrid, the whole grid
being a 64 × 64 grid). Figure 14 gives the results compared to what we obtained on Figure 12. We can
see that increasing the round numbers counterbalances the non-random repartition of walls.
5.2. Strict avalanche properties
Another important property is that, for every input value (key and plain text), a single bit change
must affect the whole ciphered text: every output bit must depend upon all input bits. This property,
known as completeness has been combined with the avalanche property: each output bit should change
with a probability of one half whenever a single input bit is complemented. This property is known as
strict avalanche property [18].
Let us look closer at this property. We have to check it for all input bits. First we are going to check
it for the key bits, and then for the plain text bits.
The following experiments were made with small data blocks (128 bytes→ 1024 bits), and small keys
(8 bytes). The number of rounds was 64, and the following algorithm has been executed for N = 1 000.
v ← 0, 0, 0..., 0, 0, 0
for n = 1 to N do
p← 128 bytes random plain text
k ← 8 bytes random key
c← encrypt(p, k)
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Figure 13: Avalanche property if we change one bit of the plain text
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Random repartition
Concentrated walls
Figure 14: Avalanche property: comparison between a random repartition of walls and a configuration with walls concen-
trated in a small surface
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for i = 0 to 63 do
k2 ← k with bit i inverted
c2 ← encrypt(p, k2)
v ← v + c xor c2 {v, c, c2 are arrays}
end for
end for
v ← v/(N × 64)
The results, given on Figure 15 show that if we change one bit of the key, the probability for every
ciphered bit to be inverted is about 0.47.
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Strict Avalanche property on key
Figure 15: Influence of changing a bit in the key : each output bit has a probability of about 0.47 to be inverted
Now, let us take a look at the influence of plain text bits. The following algorithm has been used
(N = 1 000):
v ← 0, 0, 0..., 0, 0, 0
for n = 1 to N do
p← 128 bytes random plain text
k ← 8 bytes random key
c← encrypt(p, k)
for i = 0 to 1023 do
p2 ← p with bit i inverted
c2 ← encrypt(p2, k)
v ← v + c xor c2 {v, c, c2 are arrays}
end for
end for
v ← v/(N × 1024)
Figure 16 shows the result. Again, for a bit inversion in the clear text, the probability for a bit in the
ciphered text to be inverted is 25% instead of 50%.
The can be explained if we take a closer look at the Hpp crypto algorithm structure. Think of the
lattice as a chessboard. A single plain text bit may influence either the black or the white cells. More
precisely, if complementing bit K influences black cells then, complementing bit K + 4 will influence
white cells. Using r + 1 rounds instead of r will invert black and white. The truth is that a bit inversion
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Figure 16: Influence of a bit inversion on plain text
in the clear text does not produce a bit inversion of every ciphered bit with a probability 0.25. On the
contrary, a bit inversion in the clear text produce a bit inversion in the ciphered text with a probability
0.5, for half the bits.
Figure 16 shows that strict avalanche property is not true for this hpp crypto algorithm. Instead it
is true for half the cells.
This can be emphasized if we reproduce the strict avalanche experiment but only invert bit 0 (for
instance) of the plain text. The result is given on Figure 17.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented an original algorithm for symmetric encryption based on the Hpp lat-
tice gas cellular automaton. The principle is to make data blocks evolve on a perturbed lattice. The
perturbations locations play the role of the encryption key.
It is proposed to use a large number of rounds, and to compress data, before the encryption step. In
any case, this algorithm should not be used as such.
The fact that Lgca are used to simulate complex dynamic systems [19, 12] lead us to think that there
is no obvious shortcut to compute the final configuration of the cryptographic algorithm. Let us point
out the pros and cons of hpp cryptography:
• Very large key space
• Avalanche and strict avalanche properties are satisfied for key bits
• Avalanche and strict avalanche properties are not satisfied for plain text bits. Nevertheless, the
properties are satisfied for half the encrypted block.
• hpp cryptography is slow. But parallel computation of cellular automata is conceivable.
• Size of encrypted blocks can be modified. Using large blocks increases size of the key space.
We plan to work on a modified (time reversible) fhp version of this algorithm as using an hexagonal
lattice is likely to solve the ”checker problem” and give better strict avalanche property results.
Lattice Gas Symmetric Cryptography – 06/06/21013 14
0 200 400 600 800 1,000
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0.5
half bits with probability 0
half bits with probability ≈ 0.5
Bit of ciphered text number
In
ve
rs
io
n
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
Strict Avalanche property on bit 0 of clear text
Figure 17: Influence of changing a single bit in plain text : only half of the bits is influenced
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